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The distribution of human capital and income lies at the center of a nexus of forces that shape a country’s
economic, institutional and technological structure. I develop here a uniﬁed model to analyze these inter-
actions and their growth consequences. Five main issues are addressed. First, I identify the key factors
that make both European-style “welfare state” and US-style “laissez-faire” social contracts sustainable.; I
also compare the growth rates of these two politico-economic steady states, which are no Pareto-rankable.
Second, I examine how technological evolutions aﬀect the set of redistributive institutions that can be
durably sustained, showing in particular how skill-biased technical change may cause the welfare state to
unravel. Third, I model the endogenous determination of technology or organizational form that results
from ﬁrms’ tailoring the ﬂexibility of their production processes to the distribution of workers’ skills. The
greater is human capital heterogeneity, the more ﬂexible and wage-disequalizing is the equilibrium technol-
ogy. Moreover, ﬁrms’ choices tend to generate excessive ﬂexibility, resulting in suboptimal growth or even
self-sustaining technology-inequality traps. Fourth, I examine how institutions also shape the course of
technology; thus, a world-wide shift in the technology frontier results in diﬀerent evolutions of production
processes and skill premia across countries with diﬀerent social contracts. Finally, I ask what joint con-
ﬁgurations of technology, inequality and redistributive policy are feasible in the long run, when all three
are endogenous. I show in particular how the diﬀusion of technology leads to the “exporting” of inequality
across borders; and how this, in turn, generates spillovers between social contracts that make it more
diﬃcult for nations to maintain distinct institutions and social structures.
Keywords: inequality, welfare state, technical change, skill bias, human capital, redistribution, social
contract, political economy.
JEL classiﬁcation: D31, O33, J3, H10.
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The distribution of human capital and income lies at the center of a nexus of forces that shape a country’s
economic, institutional and technological structure. This paper develops a uniﬁed model to analyze these
interactions and their implications for growth, emphasizing in particular the mechanisms that allow diﬀerent
socioeconomic structures to perpetuate themselves, and those pushing toward convergence.1 The analysis
centers around ﬁve main questions.
1. Why do countries at similar levels of development choose widely diﬀerent social contracts? Redis-
tribution —through taxes and transfers, unemployment and health insurance, education ﬁnance and
labor market regulation— displays remarkable variations even among countries with similar economic
and political fundamentals. I thus ask what makes both European-type welfare states and US-type,
more laissez-faire social contracts sustainable in the long run, together with their respective levels of
inequality.2 I then examine the eﬃciency and growth properties of these two regimes (which cannot
be Pareto ranked) and ask what shocks might cause each one to unravel. The model also sheds light
on the contrasting historical development paths of North and South America, and on the more recent
experience of East Asia versus Latin America.
2. How does skill-biased technical and organizational change impact the viability of redistributive institu-
tions? Over the last twenty-ﬁve years, most industrialized countries experienced a considerable rise
in wage inequality.3 This trend is generally attributed to three main factors: skill-biased technical
change, international trade (which lies outside the scope of this paper), and institutional change, such
as the erosion of the minimum wage and the decline of unions. But minimum wages, labor market
legislation and union power are endogenous outcomes, to the same extent as social insurance and
education policy; and indeed, they evolved quite diﬀerently in Continental Europe or Canada and
in the United States.4 Analyzing redistributive institutions as a whole, I show how skill-biased tech-
nical change can cause the welfare state to unravel, and examine more generally how technological
evolutions aﬀect the set of social contracts that can be sustained in the long run.
The previous questions aim to explain diﬀerences in redistributive policies (together with their economic
implications) and the role of technology in their evolution. The next two take the reverse perspective.
1The main channels through which inequality and redistributive institutions can in turn aﬀect growth were exposited in
Bénabou (1996).
2I shall limit my scope here to politico-economic persistence mechanisms that reﬂect diﬀerences in agents’ economic interests
and political power (Bénabou (2000), Saint Paul (2001), Hassler et al. (2003), Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002)) rather
than social norms (Lindbeck (1995)) or diﬀerences in beliefs about the mobility process and the determinants of individual
income (Piketty (1995), Bénabou and Tirole (2002), Alesina and Angeletos (2003)).
3See, e.g. Autor, Katz and Krueger (1997) or Berman, Bound and Machin (1997).
4See, e.g., Freeman (1995), Fortin and Lemieux (1997), Lee (1999), or Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001).
13. What determines the types of technologies and organizational forms used by ﬁrms? Production
processes —and in particular their degree of skill bias— are themselves endogenous, adapting over
time to the skills of the labor force.5 I develop here a new and very tractable model of technology
choice, based on the idea that ﬁrms tailor the ﬂexibility of their production processes (substitutability
between diﬀerent labor inputs) to the distribution of human capital in the workforce. The main pre-
diction is that the more heterogenous are workers’ skill levels, the more ﬂexible and wage-disequalizing
the equilibrium technology will be. In a country like Japan, by contrast, production will involve much
tighter complementarity between workers’ tasks. Integrating this model with the previous analysis
of human capital dynamics, I also show that ﬁrms’ choices involve externalities that tend to result
in excessive ﬂexibility and a suboptimal growth rate, or even in self-sustaining technology-inequality
traps.
4. What types of societies and institutions are most conducive to the emergence of skill-biased technolo-
gies and organizational forms? Through their inﬂuence on the distribution of human capital, public
policies in the ﬁscal, labor market and especially educational arenas are important determinants of
what innovations can be proﬁtably developed and adopted; the same is true for immigration. One
notes, for instance, that skill-biased technical change and reorganization occurred ﬁrst, and to a
greater extent, in the United States compared to Europe —and within the latter, more so in England
than on the Continent. Combining the technology and policy components of the model, I show how
a world-wide shift in the technological frontier leads to diﬀerent evolutions of production processes
and skill premia across countries with diﬀerent social contracts.
Two extensive but essentially disconnected literatures have examined the economic determinants and
consequences of redistributive policies on the one hand, those of biased technical change on the other.6 Yet
in reality both are endogenous, and jointly determined. The ability to conduct a uniﬁed analysis of human
capital dynamics, technology and institutions is a novel and key feature of the framework developed in this
paper. It makes it possible to address important questions such as the second, fourth and especially ﬁfth
ones on the list:
5. What “societal models” —joint conﬁgurations of technology, inequality, and policy— are feasible in the
long run? In particular, how does the diﬀusion of technology aﬀect nations’ ability to maintain their
own redistributive institutions and social structures? Analyzing the case of two countries linked
by the (endogenous) diﬀusion of their domestically developed technologies, I show how inequality
5See, e.g., Kremer and Maskin (1996), Acemoglu (1998), Kiley (1999), Lloyd-Ellis (1999), and Vindigni (1992). Relatedly,
Grossman and Maggi (2000) show how the skill distribution matters for international specialization, and Legros and Newman
(1996) how the wealth distribution aﬀects the organization of ﬁrms.
6See the previously cited references, as well as the other ones given throughout the paper.
2tends to be “exported” to the less heterogeneous one. This mechanism, in turn, generates spillovers
between the social contracts of diﬀerent nations, transmitting even purely political shocks and po-
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Figure 1: The links between inequality, technology and redistributive institutions
The paper is organized in two main parts, corresponding respectively to the left- and right-hand sides
of Figure 1.7 The ﬁrst of these two feedback loops centers on political-economy interactions. I thus present
in Sections I and II a model of inequality, growth and redistributive policy in a context of imperfect credit
and insurance markets (based on Bénabou (2000)). I ﬁrst analyze how macro and distributional dynamics
are aﬀected by redistributive policies, then how the latter are themselves determined from the preferences
and political power of diﬀerent social classes. Finally, I identify the conditions under which a single or
multiple politico-economic steady states arise.
The second and most novel part of the paper incorporates the role of technology and its interactions
with redistributive institutions. I ﬁrst consider in Section III the impact of exogenous skill-biased technical
change on inequality and the political equilibrium. I then study how technology responds to the composition
of the labor force, through ﬁrms’ choice of their degree of ﬂexibility. In Section IV both sides of Figure I are
brought together to analyze the long-run determination of institutions, technologies and the distribution of
human capital. In Section V, ﬁnally, I show how technology diﬀusion leads to the “exporting” of inequality
and international spillovers between social contracts. Section VI concludes. All proofs are gathered in the
appendix.
7Each arrow on the diagram actually corresponds to a speciﬁc equation or proposition in the model. From left to right,
these are (11), Proposition 3, (1) or later (28), and Proposition 8.
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Figure 2: The two key relationships between inequality and redistribution.
I Inequality, Redistribution, and Growth
The model presented in this section (drawing on Bénabou (2000)) can be summarized by two key relation-
ships between inequality and redistribution; both arise from imperfections in credit and insurance markets,
and are illustrated on Figure 2.
The ﬁrst locus summarizes the political mechanism: in each period, the equilibrium rate of redistribution
chosen by voters is a U-shaped function τ = T(∆) of inequality in human capital, measured here as the
variance of a lognormal distribution. The downward-sloping part of this curve, which is the crucial one,
reﬂects a very general intuition: while asset market imperfections create a scope for eﬃcient redistributive
institutions (to provide social insurance and relax credit constraints), these institutions command much
less support in an unequal society than in a relatively homogeneous one. Thus, starting from ∆ =0 ,w h e r e
there is unanimous support for the ex-ante eﬃcient degree of redistribution, growing inequality increases
t h ef r a c t i o no fa g e n t sr i c he n o u g ht ol o s ef r o m ,a n dt herefore oppose, all but relatively low levels of τ.The
upward-sloping part of the curve, in contrast, is shaped by the standard skewness eﬀect, which eventually
dominates: rising numbers of poor will eventually impose more redistribution, well beyond the point where
it ceases to be eﬃcient.8
The second curve on Figure 2 represents the accumulation mechanism: since redistribution relaxes
the credit constraints bearing on the poor’s human capital investments, long-run inequality is a declining
8See, e.g., Alesina and Rodrik (1994) or Persson and Tabellini (1994) for models leading to such a positive slope. The
empirical evidence (discussed at the end of this section) for both countries and US states provides little support for the
standard view of a positive relationship between inequality and redistribution.
4function ∆ = T(τ) of the rate of redistribution. When the two curves have several intersections, as
illustrated on the ﬁgure, these correspond to multiple politico-economic steady states that are sustainable
under the same fundamentals. One, with low inequality and high redistribution, corresponds to a European-
type welfare state; the other, with the reverse conﬁguration, to a US-type, more laissez-faire society.
In this and the next section I will derive the two loci from an explicit dynamic model, and identify
the conﬁgurations of economic and political parameters under which alternative social models can coexist.
In later sections I shall investigate how the two curves, and therefore the equilibrium set, are aﬀected by
exogenous technical change, then ultimately extend the analysis to the case where technology itself adapts
endogenously to the distribution of skills in the population.
A Production, Preferences and Policy
The economy is populated by overlapping-generations families, i ∈ [0,1]. In generation t, adult i combines
his human capital ki
t with eﬀort li













At this point the technology is exogenous and does not explicitly involve interactions among workers.
Later on I will introduce a richer production structure, where agents with diﬀerent skill levels perform
complementary tasks and the degree of substitutability between them is optimally chosen by ﬁrms. The
return to human capital γ and the mean of the productivity shocks zi
t will then be endogenous functions of
the current distribution of human capital. From the point of view of an individual worker-voter, however,
this richer structure will retain an earnings function very similar to (1), so all the results obtained with
this unconstrained reduced form will remain directly applicable.
Public policy or labor market institutions redistribute income through taxes and transfers, or a wage-
equalization scheme, that transform each agent’s gross earnings (or marginal revenue product) yi
t into a
disposable income ˆ yi
t,a ss p e c i ﬁed further below. These resources ﬁnance both the adult’s consumption, ci
t,














t+1 represents the child’s unpredictable ability, or simply luck, and α+βγ ≤ 1. T h e r ei st h u sn ol o a n
market for ﬁnancing individual investments (e.g., children cannot be held responsible for the debts of their
parents), and no insurance or securities market where the idiosyncratic risks zi
t and ξ
i
t+1 could be diversiﬁed
5away.9 Both shocks are i.i.d. and lognormal with mean one, and initial endowments are also lognormally
distributed across families: thus lnzi
t ∼ N(−v2/2,v2), lnξ
i
t ∼ N(−w2/2,w2) and lnki
0 ∼ N(m0,∆2
0).
Agents’ preferences over their own consumption, eﬀort, and child’s human capital are deﬁned recursively
over their lifetime. Once he has learned his productivity zi














The disutility of eﬀort is measured by η>1, which corresponds to an intertemporal elasticity of labor
supply of 1/(η −1). The discount factor ρ deﬁnes the relative weights of the adult’s own felicity and of his
bequest motive.10
At the beginning of period t, however, when evaluating and voting over redistributive policies, the agent
does not yet know his lifetime productivity zi
t. The resulting uncertainty over his ex—post utility level V i
t









This recursive speciﬁcation allows a to parametrize the insurance value of redistributive policies, just as
the labor supply elasticity 1/(η − 1) parametrizes the eﬀort distortions.11
The redistributive policies over which agents vote are represented by simple, progressive schemes that
map a market income yi
t (marginal revenue product) into a disposable income ˆ yi
t,a c c o r d i n gt o :
ˆ yi
t ≡ (yi
t)1−τt (˜ yt)τt. (6)
The break—even level ˜ yt is determined by the balanced-budget constraint, which requires that net transfers




t)1−τt (˜ yt)τt di = yt . (7)
The elasticity τt measures the degree of progressivity, or equalization, of redistributive institutions.12
9The absence of any intertemporal trade is clearly an oversimpliﬁed (but quite common) representation of asset market
incompleteness, making the model analytically tractable. Zhang (2001) extends a simpliﬁed version of the present model
(with a zero-one policy variable and no political-economy mechanism) to allow for physical capital and ﬁnancial bequests. He
obtains similar results for the eﬀects of inequality, plus new ones on convergence speeds to the steady-state.
10His (relative) risk—aversion with respect to the child’s endowment ki
t+1 at that stage is normalized to zero, but this plays
no role in any of the results. A dynastic speciﬁcation of preferences (Bénabou (2002)) also leads to similar aggregate and
distributional dynamics, but is less simple to work with.
11When a 6=1these recursive preferences are not time-separable (see, e.g., Kreps and Porteus (1979)), as risk-aversion
diﬀers from the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, which by (4) remains ﬁxed at one. This
last assumption, common to many papers in the literature, helps make the model analytically solvable.
12When τt > 0 the marginal rate rises with pretax income, and agents with average income are made better oﬀ: ˜ yt >y t.
The elasticity of aftertax to pretax income is indeed the “right” measure of equalization: the posttax distribution induced by
a ﬁscal scheme Lorenz—dominates the one induced by another (for all pretax distributions), if and only if the ﬁrst scheme’s
elasticity is everywhere smaller (Fellman (1976)).
6Three types of redistributive mechanisms can be considered here, being close to formally equivalent in this
model. The ﬁrst one, on which the exposition will generally focus, is that of ﬁscal policy, which equalizes
disposable incomes through taxes and transfers. A second is wage or earnings compression through labor
market institutions and policies favorable to workers with relatively low skills: minimum wage laws, union-
friendly or right-to-strike regulations, ﬁring costs, public sector pay and employment, etc.13 The third
one is education ﬁnance, where τt now applies only to human capital expenditures ei
t, as opposed to all of
income yi
t. This may be achieved through a policy of school funding equalization across local communities,
t h ep r e s e n c eo fac e n t r a l l yﬁnanced public-education system, or more generally by subsidizing diﬀerentially
the education of rich and poor students.14 Under either of the three above interpretations of τt, incentive
compatibility requires that τt ≤ 1; on the other hand a regressive policy τt < 0 cannot be ruled out a
priori, and indeed one does observe such policies, typically in countries characterized by high inequality
and a powerful ruling class.
B Distributional Dynamics and Aggregate Growth
Taking policy as parametrically given for the moment, I ﬁrst consider the resulting economic decisions of
individual agents, then the economy-wide dynamics of human capital and income.
Proposition 1 Given a rate of redistribution τt, agents in generation t choose a common labor supply and
savings rate: lt = χ(1−τt)1/η and ei
t = s ˆ yi
t, where χη ≡ (δ/η)(1−ρ+ρβ)/(1−ρ) and s ≡ ρβ/(1−ρ+ρβ).
The fact that savings are unaﬀected is due to the imperfect-altruism assumption made regarding prefer-
ences.15 Labor supply, on the other hand, declines in τt with an elasticity of 1/η, and this single distortion
will suﬃce to demonstrate how the eﬃciency costs and beneﬁts of redistributive institutions shape the set
of politico-economic equilibria.
Given Proposition 1, and substituting (6) into (3), the law of motion for human wealth is loglinear:
lnki
t+1 =l n ξ
i
t+1 + β(1 − τt)lnzi
t +l nκ + β lns (8)
+(α + βγ(1 − τt))lnki
t + βδ(1 − τt)lnlt + βτt ln ˜ yt.
13With the “autarkic” production function (1) the equivalence between the wage-income-equalization and the ﬁscal-
redistribution interpretations of τt is immediate. It continues to hold when we move in Section III.B to a richer production
structure with interacting agents.
14See Bénabou (2000) for this version of the model. Some of the formulas change slightly from those presented here for
ﬁscal policy, but without aﬀe c t i n gt h eq u a l i t a t i v en a t u r eo fa n yo ft h er e s u l t s . T h e r ea r e ,o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i m p o r t a n t
quantitative diﬀerences between the growth and welfare implications of the two policies; see Bénabou (2002) and Sheshadri
and Yuki (2000) for comparative analyzes. Previous models of redistribution centering on education ﬁnance include Becker
(1964), Loury (1981), Glomm and Ravilkumar (1992), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Bénabou (1996b) and Fernandez and
Rogerson (1996). On the empirical side, see Krueger (2002) for a comprehensive summary and discussion of the evidence on
targeted education and training policy interventions, from preschool to the college level.
15In Bénabou (2002) I develop and calibrate a version of the present model with dynastic preferences, where τt does aﬀect
the savings rate. On the other hand, agents are then able (and will indeed want) to use additional policy instruments, such
as consumption taxes and investment subsidies, to alleviate this distortion.
7This linearity reﬂects the absence of any non-convexities in the model, making clear that the multiplicity
of equilibria will arise solely through the general-equilibrium feedback from the income distribution onto
the political determination of τt.16 These simple conditional dynamics also imply that human capital and





t ∼ N(γmt + δlnlt − v2/2,γ2∆2
t + v2), (10)
where mt and ∆2
t evolve according to two simple linear diﬀerence equations obtained by taking means and
variances in (8), and given in the appendix. Since the growth of mean income yt is of more direct economic
interest than that of mean log-income mt, I present here the equivalent characterization of the economy’s
dynamic path in terms of two linear diﬀerence equations in ∆2
t and lnyt = mt + ∆2
t/2.
Proposition 2 The distributions of human capital and income at time t are given by (9)-(10), where
lt = χ(1 − τt)1/η. The evolution of inequality across generations is governed by
∆2
t+1 =( α + βγ(1 − τt))2 ∆2
t + β
2(1 − τt)2 v2 + w2, (11)
and the growth rate of aggregate income by:
ln(yt+1/yt)=l n˜ κ − (1 − α − βγ)lnyt + δ(lnlt+1 − αlnlt) − Lv(τt)v2/2 − L∆(τt)γ2∆2
t/2, (12)
where ln ˜ κ ≡ γ(lnκ + β lns) − γ(1 − γ)w2/2 is a constant and
Lv(τ) ≡ βγ(1 − βγ)(1 − τ)2 ≥ 0,
L∆(τ) ≡ α + βγ(1 − τ)2 − (α + βγ(1 − τ))2 ≥ 0.
Equation (11) shows how inequality in the next generation stems from three sources: the varying abilities of
children (w2), shocks to family income (v2), and diﬀerences in parental human capital (∆2
t), which matter
both through family income and at-home transmission. Redistribution equalizes the disposable resources
available to ﬁnance educational investments (but not social backgrounds), thus limiting both cross-sectional
inequality and the persistence of family wealth, α + βγ(1 − τt); conversely, it increases social mobility.
Equation (12) makes apparent the growth losses from inequality due to credit constraints, and how
redistribution’s impact on growth involves a tradeoﬀ between incentive and investment-allocation eﬀects.17
16Or / and a feedback from the distribution onto the technology γ, once it is endogenized later on. By contrast, nearly all
models in the literature that feature multiple equilibria rely on investment thresholds (e.g., Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee
and Newman (1993)), indivisibilities in eﬀort (Piketty (1997)), or non-homotheticity in preferences (e.g., Moav (2002)). For
a discussion of indivisibilities, see also Mookerjee and Ray (2003).
17See Bénabou (1996b) for an overview of the literature on the relationship between inequality and growth, which is not
the main focus of the present paper. In particular, inequality can also have positive eﬀects on growth when there are non-
8The eﬀort distortion corresponds to the term in δ, which declines with parallel increases in τt and τt+1. The
reallocation of human capital investments across diﬀerentially wealth-constrained agents is captured by the
terms in Lv(τt) and L∆(τt). When α =0both are equal, and proportional to the concavity βγ(1−βγ) of the
common accumulation technology facing all families: diﬀerences in parental human capital and productivity
shocks simply combine into variations in disposable income, (1−τt)2 ¡
γ2∆2
t + v2¢
, which credit constraints
then translate into ineﬃcient variations in investment, reducing overall growth proportionately. When
α>0, however, disparate family backgrounds ki
t represent complementary inputs that generate diﬀerential
returns to investment, thus reducing the desirability of equalizing resources. Thus L∆(τ) now diﬀers from
Lv(τ), and is minimized for τ =( 1− α − βγ)/(1 − βγ), which decreases with α.
The term in −lnyt in the growth equation, ﬁnally, reﬂects the standard convergence eﬀect. It disappears
under constant aggregate returns, namely when α + βγ =1 , or when the constant κ in (3) is replaced by








This last variant yields an endogenous-growth version of the model, where all the predictions obtained
with a constant κ in (12) now directly transpose from short-run growth and long-run per capita income to
long-term growth rates.
Are the potential growth-enhancing eﬀects of redistributive policies in the presence of credit constraints
signiﬁcant, or trivial compared to the standard deadweight losses? While the answer must ultimately
come from empirical studies of speciﬁc policy programs or experiments, recent quantitative models suggest
very important long-run eﬀects, ranging from several percentage points of steady-state GDP to several
percentage points of long-run growth, depending on the presence of accumulated factors, such as physical
capital or knowledge spillovers, that complement individual human capital. Calibrating to US data a
model with neither eﬀort distortions nor complementarities, Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) ﬁnd that
complete school ﬁnance equalization raises long-run GDP by 3.2 %. In a model with both educational
and ﬁnancial bequests, Sheshadri and Yuki (2000) ﬁnd that a mix of ﬁscal and educational redistribution
that approximates current US policies raises long-run income by 13.5%, relative to laissez-faire. This more
substantial impact primarily reﬂects the induced adjustment of physical capital, but it remains a level
eﬀect due to decreasing returns to the two types of capital together. In a dynastic-utility version of the
present model with endogenous growth (Bénabou (2002)) I ﬁnd that the growth-maximizing value for
ﬁscal redistribution is τfisc = 21%, which corresponds to a share of redistributive transfers in GDP of
6%; in spite of reduced labor supply this raises the long-run growth rate by 0.5 percentage points. Under
convexities in either the investment technology (e.g., Galor and Zeira (1993)) or in preferences (e.g., Galor and Moav (1999)).
For recent contributions to the empirical debate, see Forbes (2000) and Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003).
9the alternative policy of progressive education ﬁnance, the growth-maximizing equalization rate for school
expenditures is τeduc = 62%, which raises long-run growth by 2.4 percentage points. In both cases, the
eﬃcient policy involves the top 30% of families subsidizing the bottom 70%, whether through the ﬁscal or
the education system.
C Voter Preferences, Political Power, and Equilibrium Policy
I now turn to the determination of policy, which reﬂects both individual citizens’ preferences and the
allocation of power in the political system. In each generation, before the productivity shocks zi
t are
realized, agents vote on the rate of redistribution τt to which they will be subject; again, this could be
through the ﬁscal system, labor market regulation, or education ﬁnance. Applying Propositions 1 and 2
to equations (4)-(5), an individual i’s intertemporal welfare Ui
t can be computed from (5) as a function of
the proposed policy τt, his endowment ki
t, and the overall distribution of human capital (mt,∆t), which is
the system’s state variable.18 Deﬁning the composite eﬃciency parameter
B ≡ a + ρ(1 − a)(1 − β) ≥ 0, (14)



















The ﬁrst term inside the brackets, which disappears when summing across agents, reﬂects the basic re-
distributive conﬂict: since τt reallocates resources (spent on both consumption and children’s education)
from rich to poor households, the latter want it to be high, and the former, low. The next two terms
represent the aggregate welfare cost and aggregate welfare beneﬁt of a marginal increase in τt. First, there
is the deadweight loss due to the distortion in eﬀort: it is proportional to the labor supply elasticity 1/η,
and vanishes at τ =0 . Second, the term (1 − τt)(γ2∆2
t + Bv2), which is maximized for τt =1 , embodies
the (marginal) eﬃciency gains that arise from better insurance and the redistribution of resources towards
more severely credit-constrained investments. Indeed it is clear from (14) that the composite parameter B
multiplying the variance of adults’ income shocks v2 is monotonically related to both risk—aversion a and
to the extent of decreasing returns in human-capital investment, 1 − β.19 As to initial income inequality,
18See the appendix. Note that due to the model’s overlapping—generations structure, voting involves no intertemporal
strategic considerations.
19More speciﬁcally, under constant returns (β =1 )t h et e r m(1−ρ +ρβ)Bv2 reduces to a(1 −τ)v2, which is the insurance
value of a marginal reduction in the lifetime resource risk (1 − τ)2v2/2 faced by agents. Conversely, for risk—neutral agents
who care only about their oﬀspring (a =0 ,ρ =1 )that same term becomes β(1 − β)(1 − τ)v2, which is the gain in expected
(and aggregate) human capital growth resulting from a marginal decrease in the variability of post-tax resources (1−τ)2v2/2,
given the concavity of the investment technology.
10the term γ2∆2
t reﬂects two motives for redistribution.20 First, relaxing preexisting credit constraints tends
to increase overall growth (see the last term in (12)), and therefore also average welfare. Second, with
concave (logarithmic) utility functions, average welfare increases whenever individual consumptions (of ci
t
and ki
t+1) are distributed more equally. Equivalently here, this captures the eﬀect of skewness: given mt,
ah i g h e r∆2
t implies a higher per capita income lnyt = mt + ∆2
t/2, making redistribution more attractive
for the median voter, and more generally at any given level of ki
t.
From this analysis it easily follows that agent i’s preferred tax rate, obtained as the unique solution
τi
t < 1 to the quadratic equation (15), decreases with his endowment ki
t and increases with the ex-ante
beneﬁts from redistribution Bv2. Similarly,
¯ ¯τi
t
¯ ¯ decreases with 1/η, as a more elastic labor supply magniﬁes
the distortions that result from redistributive policies —whether progressive, τ>0, or regressive, τ<0.
I now turn from the preferences of diﬀerent classes of voters to their political power or inﬂuence over the
process that determines the actual τt. Even in advanced democracies, poor and less educated individuals
have a lower propensity to register, turn out to vote and give political contributions, than better-oﬀ ones.
For voting itself the tendency is relatively moderate, whereas for contributing to campaigns it is drastic.
Even for political activities that are time- rather than money-intensive, such as writing to Congress,
attending meetings, trying to convince others, etc., the propensity to participate rises sharply with income
and education. These facts are documented for instance in Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), while Bartels
(2002) provides a striking study of how they translate into disproportionate political inﬂuence. Studying
the roll calls of US senators in three Congresses he ﬁnds that their votes are more responsive, by a factor
ranging from 3 to 15, to the views of their constituents located the 75th income percentile than to those
of the 25th; and again more responsive, by a factor of 2 to 3, to the views of the 99th percentile than to
those of the 75th. In less developed countries there is also extensive vote-buying, clientelism, intimidation
and the like, which are likely to result in even more bias.
To summarize this political inﬂuence of human and ﬁnancial wealth in a simple manner I shall assume
that the pivotal voter is located at the 100 × p∗ -th percentile of the distribution, where the critical level
p∗ can be any number in [0,1]. A perfect democracy corresponds to p∗ =1 /2, while an imperfect one
where participation or inﬂuence rises with social status corresponds to p∗ > 1/2.21 Given that ki
t is here
log-normally distributed, an equivalent but more convenient measure of the political system’s departure
from the democratic ideal is
20See Bénabou (2000) for the exact decomposition.
21Since individual preferences are single-peaked and the preferred policy is monotonic in ki
t, it is easy to show that such
ac r i t i c a lp∗ is a suﬃcient statistic for any ordinal weighing scheme where each agent’s opinion is aﬀected by a weight, or
relative probability of voting, ωi (with
U 1
0 ωj dj =1 ) , that increases with his rank in the distribution of human capital or
income. Alternatively, political inﬂuence may depend on individuals’ income levels. Thus, with ωi proportional to (yi)λ it
can be shown that the pivotal voter has rank p∗ = Φ(λ∆),s ot h a tλ in (16) is simply replaced by λ∆. As intuition suggests,
this alternative formulation only reinforces the key result that eﬃcient redistributions may decline with inequality, since it
implies that the political system tends to becomes more biased towards the wealthy as inequality rises.
11λ ≡ Φ−1(p∗), (16)
where Φ(·) denotes the c.d.f. of a standard normal. I shall refer to λ a st h ed e g r e eo fwealth bias in
the political system, and focus on the empirically relevant case where λ>0.22 Given the location of the
pivotal voter, the policy outcome is simply obtained by setting lnki
t−mt = λ∆t in the ﬁrst-order condition
∂Ui















When labor supply is inelastic (1/η =0 ) , it is immediately apparent that this equilibrium tax rate is
U—shaped in ∆t, and minimized where γ2∆2 = Bv2. This is true more generally.
Proposition 3 T h er a t eo fr e d i s t r i b u t i o nτt = T(∆t) chosen in generation t is such that:
1) τt increases with the ex—ante eﬃciency gain from redistribution Bv2, and decreases with the political
inﬂuence of wealth, λ.
2) |τt| decreases with the elasticity of labor supply 1/η.
3) τt is U-shaped with respect to inequality ∆t. It starts at the ex—ante optimal rate T(0) > 0, declines
to a minimum at some ∆ > 0, then rises back towards T(∞)=1 . The larger Bv2, t h ew i d e rt h er a n g e
[0,∆) where ∂τt/∂∆t < 0.
The ﬁrst two results show that equilibrium policy depends on the costs and beneﬁts of redistribution
and on the allocation of political inﬂuence in a sensible manner. The third one conﬁrms the key insight
that eﬃcient redistributions may decrease with inequality; more speciﬁcally, it yields the U-shaped function
τ = T(∆) shown on Figure 2. The underlying intuition is simple, and very general: a) when distributional
conﬂict γ∆ is small enough relative to the ex-ante eﬃciency gains Bv2, there is widespread support for
the redistributive policy, so its equilibrium level is high; b) as inequality rises, so does the proportion of
agents rich enough to be net losers from the policy, who will block all but relatively low levels of τt; c) at
still higher levels of inequality, the standard skewness eﬀect eventually dominates: there are so many poor
that they impose high redistribution, even when it is very ineﬃcient.23
It is now well-recognized that the standard median-voter model’s prediction of a positive eﬀect of
inequality on redistribution fails to explain the empirical patterns actually observed, both across countries
(see, e.g., Perotti (1996), Bénabou (1996a, 2000), Alesina et al. (2002)) and within them (see Rodriguez
22Recent papers that aim to endogenously explain the allocation of political power in a country (corresponding here to the
parameter λ) include Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), Pineda and Rodriguez (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), and
Baland and Robinson (2003).
23A similar form of non-monotonicity (U-shape, or even declining throughout for λ high enough) is obtained with a Pareto
distribution by Lee and Romer (1998).
12(1999) for panel-data tests on US states). Among developed countries, in particular, the relationship is
in fact negative (Pineda and Rodriguez (2000). The present framework explains how and when greater
inequality will indeed reduce redistribution, or even result in regressive policies —both in the short run
(Proposition 3) and in the long-run, when both are endogenous (Proposition 4 below). Furthermore, the
distinctive non—monotonic relationship predicted by the model turns out to have empirical support: in
tests using cross-country data, Figini (1999) ﬁnds in a signiﬁcant U-shaped eﬀect of income inequality on
the shares of tax revenues and government expenditures in GDP; De Mello and Tiongson (2003) ﬁnd a
similar pattern for government transfers.
II Sustainable Social Contracts
A Dynamics and Steady States







where T(∆t) is given by Proposition 3 and D(∆t,τt) by (11). Under a time—invariant policy, in particular,





1 − (α + βγ(1 − τ))2 ≡ D2(τ). (19)
A steady-state equilibrium is an intersection of this downward-sloping locus, ∆ = D(τ), with the U-shaped
curve τ = T(∆), as illustrated in Figure 2. The following key proposition identiﬁes the conditions under
which multiple intersections occur.
Proposition 4 Let 1 − α<2βγ. When the normalized eﬃciency gain B is below some critical value B
there is a unique, stable, steady—state. When B>B , on the other hand, there exist λ and ¯ λ with 0 <λ< ¯ λ,
such that:
1) For each λ in [λ, ¯ λ] there are (at least) two stable steady states.24
2) For λ<λor λ>¯ λ the steady—state is unique.
These results can shed light on a number of important issues and puzzles raised in the introduction.
First, they explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can nonetheless
sustain very diﬀerent redistributive institutions, such as a European-style welfare state and a US-style
24See Bénabou (2000) for additional results on the number of stable steady-states (n ≤ 4), including conditions ensuring
that n =2 .
13laissez-faire social contract. Notably, these two societies cannot be Pareto ranked. Recall also that τt
can be equally interpreted as describing tax-and-transfer policy, labor market regulation, or (with some
minor changes) education ﬁnance policy. Moreover, it is clear that the model’s key mechanism makes these
multiple dimensions of policy complementary, so that they will tend to covary positively across countries,
as indeed they do empirically. A more egalitarian education system, for instance, tends to reduce income
inequality, which in turn increases political support for ﬁscal redistribution or labor-earnings compression
—and vice-versa. Summarizing a large collective research project on Sweden, Freeman (1995) emphasizes
the presence of such complementarities, describing “a highly interrelated welfare state and economy in
which many parts ﬁt together (be they subsidies, taxes, wage compression etc.)”.
Second, the two conditions required for multiplicity embody very general intuitions that are easily
understood in the context of Figure 2. To start with, the ex-ante welfare beneﬁts of redistribution must
be high enough, relative to the costs.25 Otherwise the T curve will be upward-sloping except over a very
narrow initial range, and consequently have a unique intersection with the D curve; economically speaking,
we would be close to the standard, complete-markets case. In addition, the political power of the wealthy
must lie in some intermediate range, otherwise the T curve will lie too high or too low relative to the
D curve, and again there will be a unique intersection, with high inequality and low redistribution, or
vice-versa.
Third, while in the short-run the relationship is non-monotonic, there emerges in the long—run a negative
correlation between inequality and redistribution, as indeed one observes between the United States and
Europe, or among advanced countries in general (Pineda and Rodriguez (2000)).
Fourth, history matters in an important and plausible way: temporary shocks to the distribution of
wealth (immigration, educational discrimination, demand shifts) as well as to the political system (slavery,
voting rights restrictions) can permanently move society from one equilibrium to the other, or more gen-
erally have long-lasting eﬀects on inequality, growth, and institutions. In particular, the model provides
a formalization of Engerman and Sokoloﬀ’s (1998) thesis about the historical origins of South and North
America’s very diﬀerent development paths, which they trace back to the former set of New World colonies
having had much higher initial inequality ∆0, and a much more concentrated power structure λ0, than the
latter.26
Finally, the model also shows that diﬀerent sources of inequality have diﬀerent eﬀects on redistributive
institutions —which, in particular, sheds doubt on the possibility of empirically estimating a catch-all rela-
tionship between inequality and redistribution, or inequality and growth. Indeed, one can show (provided
25The claim with respect to the beneﬁts is clear from Proposition 4; with respect to the costs one can show, under additional
technical assumptions, that the threshold B shifts up as the labor supply elasticity 1/η rises.
26This, in turn, was due to reasons linked to the technologies required for the diﬀerent goods these colonies were producing
—a point I shall come back to in Section III.A.
141/η is not too large) that the threshold for multiplicity B is a decreasing function of the variance ratio
v2/w2, with limv/w→0 (B)=+ ∞ and limv/w→+∞ (B)=0 . Quite intuitively, income uncertainty interacts
with the incompleteness in insurance and credit markets in generating ex ante eﬃciency gains from redis-
tribution, as reﬂected by the term Bv2 in (17). By contrast, a greater variance w2 of the endowments that
agents receive prior to choosing policy increases the distributional conﬂict between identiﬁable losers and
gainers from the policy. Thus, whereas an increase in the variability of sectoral shocks (similar to v2) will
lead to an expansion of the welfare state, a surge in immigration that results in a greater heterogeneity of
the population (similar to a rise in w2) can easily lead to cutbacks, or even a large—scale dismantling. We
shall observe similar eﬀects when studying the political implications of skill-biased technical change.
B Which Societies Grow Faster?
As mentioned earlier, the steady states corresponding to diﬀerent social contracts are not Pareto—rankable:
rich enough agents always prefer a more laissez-faire society, while those who are poor enough always want
more of a welfare state. One may still ask, however, how these two social models compare in terms of
aggregate growth. This question is important ﬁrst for its policy content, and second to know whether
one should expect any empirical relationship between inequality and growth, when account is taken of the
fact that both are endogenous. The answer hinges on the basic tradeoﬀ, discussed earlier, between the
distortions induced by redistribution and its beneﬁcial eﬀect on credit—constraints (magniﬁed, in the long
run, by the fact that it also reduces income inequality γ∆∞). This is made clear by the following results,
which apply equally in the short and in the long run.27
Proposition 5 Compared to a more laissez-faire alternative τ0, a more redistributive social contract τ>τ 0
is associated with lower inequality, and
1) has higher growth when tax distortions are small (1/η ≈ 0) relative to those induced by credit
constraints on the accumulation of human capital (βγ < 1);
2) has lower growth when tax distortions are high (1/η > 0) and the credit—constraint eﬀect is weak
(βγ ≈ 1).
The ﬁrst scenario, of “growth-enhancing redistributions”, seems most relevant for developing countries,
where capital markets are less well-functioning, and for redistribution through public investments in hu-
man capital and health. One may contrast here the paths followed by East Asia and Latin America in
those respects. The result may also help understand why regression estimates of the eﬀects of social and
educational transfers on growth are often signiﬁcantly positive, or at least rarely signiﬁcantly negative.
27See Section I.B for the simple correspondence between the stationary and the endogenous-growth versions of the model,
where policy aﬀects growth in the short and the long-run respectively.
15The second, Eurosclerosis” scenario can account for why Europeans consistently choose more social
insurance than Americans —at the cost of higher unemployment and slower growth —even though they are
not necessarily more risk-averse. The intuition is that, in more homogenous societies, there is less erosion
of the consensus over social insurance mechanisms which, ex—ante, would be valued enough to compensate
for lesser growth prospects.28
Putting the two cases together, ﬁnally, Proposition 5 can also be related to the empirical ﬁndings of
Barro (2000) that inequality tends to be negatively associated with subsequent growth in poor countries,
but positively associated with it in richer ones. To the extent that poor countries are also those where
credit markets are least developed, Proposition 5 predicts that inequality-reducing policies will give rise to
just such a dichotomy.
III Technology and the Social Contract
I shall now extend the model to analyze how technology and redistributive institutions both aﬀect inequality
and respond to it, and consequently how they inﬂuence each other —as described on Figure 1. Of particular
interest are the following questions. First, how does technical change impact the sustainability of welfare-
state and laissez-faire social contracts? Second, what types of societies are likely to be leaders or early
adopters in developing or implementing ﬂexible, skill-biased technologies or organizational forms? More
generally, how do the skill distribution among workers and the production side of the economy shape each
other, through human capital investments and technology choices? Finally, what happens in the long run
when technological and institutional factors evolve interdependently —within a country, and possibly even
across countries?
A Exogenous Technical Change and the Viability of the Welfare State
I ﬁrst examine here how technical or organizational change that increases the return to human capital
aﬀects redistributive institutions. This policy response represents an additional channel through which
technological evolutions aﬀect the income distribution, in addition to their direct impact via the wage
structure.
Figure 3 illustrates the eﬀects of an increase in γ, the coeﬃcient on human capital in the production
and earnings function (1). As will from now on be made explicit in the notation, this aﬀects both of the
key curves describing the inequality-redistribution nexus:
28For the speciﬁc case of unemployment insurance, Hassler et al. (1999) provide a complementary explanation, based on
interactions with workers’ specialization (or lack thereof) that can result in multiple equilibria.
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Figure 3: The eﬀects of an increase in the returns to human capital, γ =( σ − 1)/σ.
i) The intergenerational-transmission locus ∆ = D(τ;γ) shifts up, and becomes less steep: for given
human capital inequality ∆t and policy τ there is more inequality in incomes γ∆t, hence also in investments,
and consequently more inequality of human capital (and of course income) in all subsequent periods.29
ii) The policy locus τ = T(γ∆) shifts down over [0,∆), a n du po v e r(∆,+∞):since what matters for
the political outcome is income inequality γ∆ (see (17), an increase in γ for given ∆ has the same U-shaped
eﬀe c to nr e d i s t r i b u t i o na sa ni n c r e a s ei n∆ for given γ —initially lowering τ, then raising it.
Figure 3 directly yields a local analysis of the more egalitarian, welfare-state equilibrium —and more
generally, of any steady state that occurs along the declining portion of the T locus.30
Proposition 6 Let (∆,τ,γ) be such that (∆,τ) is a stable steady state under the technology γ, with
∆ < ∆(Bv2;γ). A marginal increase in γ results in higher long run human capital and income inequality,
as well as in less redistribution.





t−1)β . The kind of technical change considered here raises the return to all three components of ki
t
equally. In Galor and Tsiddon (1997) by contrast, major innovations raise the relative return to pure ability, while subsequent
learning-by-doing innovations raise the relative return to inherited human capital. In Galor and Moav (2000) human capital
is also sector-speciﬁc, and therefore eroded by new technologies, to an extent that decreases with individual ability. In these
models technological innovations can thus raise as well as lower integenerational mobility.
30For steady-states that occur on the rising part, local comparative statics are ambiguous. Note, however, that in versions
of the model where power inequality rises with income or human wealth inequality —meaning that λ increases with ∆ (see
footnote 21)— the declining portion of the locus is wider and the increasing portion reduced, making it easier to rule out such
equilibria. For instance, if political power ωi is proportional to (yi)λ —e.g., “one dollar, one vote” for λ =1 − then λ is simply
replaced by λ∆ everywhere. As seen from (17), for 1/η =0the T(γ∆) curve is then decreasing throughout.
17T h ep o l i c yr e s p o n s et h u sa m p l i ﬁes the direct eﬀect of skill-biased technical progress on disposable
incomes —and, over time, on the distributions of human capital and earnings. Figure 3 also suggests that it
can have, in the long run, much more drastic consequences for redistributive institutions: starting from a
situation with multiple steady states, an increase in γ tends to undermine the sustainability of the “Welfare
State” equilibrium. Similarly, we shall see that starting from a conﬁguration with a single “Welfare-State”
it can make a second, “Laissez-Faire” equilibrium appear. Such a global analysis is potentially quite
complicated, however, since in general there may be more than two stable equilibria, and some may also
occur in the upward-sloping portion of the τ = T(γ∆) locus, where the policy response has a dampening
rather than an amplifying eﬀect on inequality. To demonstrate the most interesting insights, I shall therefore
impose some simplifying assumptions. First, I restrict voters to a choice between only two policies:
• A generous “Welfare State” social contract, corresponding to a relatively high rate of redistribution
¯ τ ∈ (0,1);
• Am o r e“Laissez Faire” social contract, corresponding to a relatively low rate of redistribution τ ∈
(0,¯ τ).
Once again, τ can be interpreted as corresponding to either ﬁscal redistribution, wage compression
through labor market regulation, or education ﬁnance progressivity. To further simplify the problem I
abstract from labor supply distortions (1/η =0 )and assume that B is large enough that both potential
steady states are always on the downward-sloping part of the τ = T(∆γ) curve, which is the one of most
interest.31
G i v e na ni n i t i a ld i s t r i b u t i o no fh u m a nc a p i t a l∆t, the more redistributive policy τt =¯ τ is adopted over
τt = τ if Ui
t(¯ τ) >U i
t(τ) for at least a critical fraction p∗ ≡ Φ(λ) of the population. Note from (15) that
with 1/η =0,∂ U i
t/∂τt is linear in τt, so the preceding inequality evaluated at lnki
t = mt +λ∆t takes the
form:
(¯ τ − τ)
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We ﬁrst see that the political inﬂuence of wealth must not be too large, compared to the aggregate welfare
gain from redistribution relative to laissez faire (net of the deadweight loss, which I am here abstracting
from). Second, preexisting income inequality raises the hurdle that public policy must overcome, as the
ex-ante beneﬁtt e r mBv2 is divided by γ∆t. This eﬀect impedes the adoption of more redistributive
31The required condition appears in Proposition 7. It is thus not inevitably the case that skill-biased technical progress
leads to a retrenchment of redistributive institutions; the model allows for the reverse case, for steady-states that occur on
the rising part of the T locus. The case on which I focus, however, appears to be the most relevant for recent trends, and in
any case is the more robust, since: i) when multiple steady-states exist, there is always at least one the declining part; ii) in
simple and plausible variants of the model, the T l o c u si sd e c r e a s i n gt h r o u g h o u t( s e ef o o t n o t e3 0 ) .
18institutions (τ =¯ τ) where they had not previously been in place, because of the greater divergence of
interests that results over time from a more laissez-faire system (τ = τ). Pushing in the other direction —
namely, intensifying the demand for redistribution as inequality rises— are the eﬀects of skewness and initial
credit-constraints, reﬂected in the additive term γ∆t. As a result of these oﬀsetting forces, the right-hand
side of (20) is U-shaped in γ∆t. To focus on the long—run, let us now replace human capital inequality ∆t





1 − (α + βγ(1 − τ))2, (21)
which is the long-run inequality in human capital resulting from a constant policy τ and technology γ.











≡ ¯ λ(γ;B). (22)












The two regimes coexist if and only if λ(γ;B) < ¯ λ(γ;B), or:
¯ λ(γ;B) − λ(γ;B)












We thus obtain here the analogue, for a discrete policy choice, of Proposition 4: multiplicity requires that




· D(¯ τ,γ) · D(τ,γ) ≡ B(γ), (25)





(22)-(23).32 Now, furthermore, we shall see that (under appropriate conditions) the skill bias γ must also
be neither too high nor too low, given λ. This result is illustrated in Figure 4.
Proposition 7 Let 1/η =0and Bv2 >γ max · D(τ,γmax), where γmax ≡ (1 − α)/β. There exist two
skill-bias thresholds γ(λ;B) < ¯ γ(λ;B), both decreasing in λ and increasing in B, such that:
32Note also that as B increases both λ and ¯ λ rise, but (24) shows that the interval [λ, ¯ λ] widens. When (25) does not hold,
on the other hand, we have ¯ λ<λ . For λ/ ∈ [¯ λ,λ] there is a unique steady—state, but for λ ∈ [¯ λ,λ] the economy can instead be
shown to cycle between the two regimes, as in Gradstein and Justman (1997). This feature reﬂects the restriction of policy
to a binary choice.
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Technology, political inﬂuence, and the social contract. E denotes the set
of stable steady-states, with ¯ τ = “Welfare State” and τ= “Laissez Faire”.
i) for γ<γ (λ;B), the unique steady state corresponds to the welfare-state outcome (¯ τ,D(¯ τ,γ));




, both (¯ τ,D(¯ τ,γ)) and (τ,D(τ,γ)) are stable steady states;
iii) for γ ∈ [¯ γ(λ;B),γmax], the unique steady state is laissez-faire, (τ,D(τ,γ)).
These results have a number of important implications.
First, they conﬁrm that the Welfare State becomes unsustainable when technology becomes too skill-
biased; and, conversely, that multiple social contracts can coexist only when γ is in some intermediate
range.33 We see here again at work the general insight that sources of heterogeneity that are predictable
on the basis of of initial endowments —a greater variance of abilities, w2, as discussed earlier, or greater
skill bias γ, as here— push equilibrium institutions towards less redistribution.
Second, Proposition 7 also reveals interesting interactions between the production and political “tech-
nologies”. As seen on Figure 4, in a country with relatively little wealth bias the welfare state is —for better
of for worse— much more “immune” to skill-biased technical change than in one where λ is high. Similarly,
a given change in the political system will have very diﬀerent eﬀects on redistributive institutions, depend-
ing on how skill-biased the technology is. Finally, the “surest way” to set out on a course of persistently
high inequality and ineﬃciently regressive (or insuﬃciently progressive) institutions is to start out with
33Hassler et al. (2003) also show that the “welfare-state” equilibrium in their model no longer exists above a certain level
of skill bias. The mechanism is quite diﬀerent, however: it is the anticipation of a higher skill premium that causes more
agents to invest in education —to the point where, ex-post, a majority of them end up with high incomes (the distribution is
negatively skewed), and therefore oppose redistribution.
20both a production structure that generates high wage inequality, and a political system marked by a high
degree of bias. As demonstrated by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1995), such were the initial conditions found
in the plantation-based and natural-resource based colonies of Central and South America in the 16th
and 17thcenturies —in contrast to those of North America, where agriculture was not subject to signiﬁcant
increasing returns to scale, and initial institutions were much less oligarchic.
Third, our result can also be related to that of Acemoglu, Aghion and Violante (2001), who show that
skill-biased technical progress may cause a decline in unionization. While their model is quite diﬀerent, it
shares the two key features emphasized in previous sections. First, relatively rich agents —namely skilled
workers— are pivotal, in the sense that it is their willingness to leave or avoid the unionized sector that
limits the extent of wage compression. Second, in making this mobility decision —voting with their feet—
they trade oﬀ redistributive losses (unions redistribute towards unskilled workers, who are a majority in
the unionized sector) against ex-ante eﬃciency beneﬁts: unions provide insurance through wage-sharing
and / or a safeguard against the “holdup” by ﬁrms of workers’ speciﬁc human capital investments; even
when they play no such role, leaving the unionized sector involves mobility costs. Consequently, when
skill-biased technical change makes the interests of the two classes of workers too divergent, redistributive
institutions —here, union participation— will decline. Moreover, this can happen ineﬃciently.34
B Skills, Technology, and Income Inequality
I now turn to the reverse mechanism and examine how inequality itself feeds back onto the nature of tech-
nical change, making γ endogenous. Recognizing that individuals do not produce in isolation, I model pro-
duction interactions with a simple specialization structure where workers perform complementary tasks.35
Final output is produced by competitive ﬁrms, using a continuum of diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs:









where xt(s) denotes the quantity of input s, zt(s) an i.i.d. sectoral shock, and At a TFP parameter.
Workers specialize in a single good, which they produce using their human capital and labor. Since they















34Relatedly, note from Figure 4 that a minor change in γ can trigger a signiﬁcant decline in redistribution from ¯ τ to τ,
and recall from Proposition 5 that the latter can easily lead to lower aggregate growth. The same is clearly true for average
welfare, e.g. when 1/η =0 .
35Building on those in Bénabou (1996) and Tamura (1992), themselves based on Romer (1987).
21The corresponding hourly wages are ωi
t = pi
t ki
t, and the resulting incomes
yi
t = ωi






















This earnings function is exactly the same as in previous sections (see (1)), with









σ, which acts as a shift in the mean of the productivity
shocks zi
t. While ˜ At varies endogenously with the economy’s state variables (mt,∆2
t), individual workers
and voters take it as given in their decisions over (li
t,c i
t) and their votes over τt.36 Consequently, the
entire analysis of earlier sections still applies, with the simple substitution of ˜ At ·zi
t wherever zi
t previously
appeared. Conditional on γ, distributional dynamics and the political equilibrium thus remain essentially
unchanged, and so do the corresponding ∆ = D(τ,γ) and τ = T(γ∆) loci.
I now consider ﬁrms. Recall that in equilibrium all workers supply the same eﬀort li
t = lt and the
distribution of human capital remains lognormal, lnki
t ∼ N(mt,∆2
t). The output of a representative ﬁrm
is thus:


















Keeping average human capital constant, the loss e−∆2
t/2σ makes apparent the productivity costs imposed
by (excessive) heterogeneity of the labor force: poorly educated, insuﬃciently skilled production and clerical
workers drag down the productivity of engineers, managers, scientists, etc. We also see that a production
technology with greater substitutability between the tasks performed by diﬀerent types of workers reduces
these costs of skill disparities (Bénabou (1996), Grossman and Maggi (2000)). Indeed, this greater ﬂexibility
allows ﬁrms to more easily substitute towards the more productive workers, and conversely reduce their
dependence on low-skill labor. This may be achieved by internal retooling, reorganization, or by outsourcing
certain activities to competitive subcontractors.37 One can also think of a higher σ as a more discriminating
search technology, resulting in more assortative matching between workers —that is, in a more segregated
production structure (Kremer and Maskin (1996), (2003)).38
Naturally, production processes with less complementarity between workers of diﬀerent skills result in
greater inequality of wages and incomes, as they have the eﬀect of uncoupling their marginal products:
36Note again the role of the overlapping-generations structure with “imperfect” altruism in simplifying the voting problem.
Observe also that τt can now, as claimed earlier, be interpreted as the extent of wage income compression, i.e. the degree of
progressivity in the mapping (deﬁned by (6)) from workers’ true marginal revenue products yi
t (given by (28)) to the labor
earning they actually receive, ˆ yi
t.
37For evidence on organizational change, see for instance Caroli and Van Reenen (1999).
38When labor supply is endogenous, 1/η > 0, ah i g h e rσ also induces workers to increase their labor supply, as they face
a less elastic demand curve: by Proposition 1, lt = χ(1 − τt)1/η, with now γ =( σ − 1)/σ. This eﬀect is independent of any















C Technological Choice and Endogenous Flexibility
More ﬂexible technologies and production processes require costly investments or reorganizations. More-
over, their beneﬁts to an individual ﬁrm are endogenous even in the short run (i.e., given the skill compo-
sition of the labor force), as they depend on the decisions of other ﬁrms, which aﬀect the wage structure.
I therefore now model ﬁrms’ choices of technology or organizational form, proposing a new and very
simple formulation that highlights the roles of heterogeneity and ﬂexibility. In every period, ﬁrms have
access to a menu of potential technologies with diﬀerent elasticities of substitution σ ∈ [1,+∞) and
associated costs c(σ); the latter result in a TFP factor A(σ)=e−c(σ), with c0 > 0 and c00 > 0.39 Given the
distribution of workers’ human capital lnki
t ∼ N(m,∆2
t) and the technology σt used by its competitors,















Substituting from (27) for the equilibrium input prices pi
t, and normalizing by the other ﬁrms’ marginal
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Intuitively, the marginal beneﬁto fﬂexibility rises with the variability of skills in the labor force, but
decreases with the degree to which other ﬁrms choose technologies that allow them to more easily substitute
toward better workers, since in doing so they drive up the skill premium.
39I thus abstract here from the intertemporal (investment) aspects of innovation that would be part of a more complete
(but also more complicated) model of technological change; see, e.g., Acemoglu (1998), Kiley (1999), Lloyd-Ellis (1999), or
Aghion (2002).
23Proposition 8 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium in technology choice. The more heterogenous the
workforce, the more ﬂexible and skill-biased the technology used by ﬁrms: σt = σ∗(∆t) is the solution to
c0(σ∗)=∆2/2(σ∗)2, with 0 <∂lnσ∗/∂ ln∆ < 1.
This result has several interesting implications.
A ﬁrst one is the magniﬁcation of wage inequality: the return to human capital ∂ lnωi
t/∂ lnki
t =( σt−1)/σt is
higher where the labor force is more heterogenous, further amplifying wage diﬀerentials across educational
levels. This simple prediction could be tested empirically across countries and / or time periods.40
A second implication is the potential for “immiserizing technological choices”. Proposition 8 states
that σ increases with ∆; conversely, because of credit constraints, human capital heterogeneity itself rises
over time with γ =( σ − 1)/σ, and in the long-run ∆ = D(τ,γ), which is increasing in γ. Could these two
mechanisms reinforce each other to the point of resulting in multiple steady states even under a ﬁxed policy
—whether activist or laissez-faire— and even though, once again, there are no non-convexities in the model?
The idea is that a high degree of skill bias results in very low wages for unskilled workers, severely limiting
the extent to which they can invest in human capital (for themselves or their children). This, in turn, leads
ﬁrms to again choose a very ﬂexible, skill-biased technology in the next period, and so on. Conversely, a
less skilled-biased technology and a less dispersed distribution of human wealth could be self-sustaining.


















β(1 − γ)(1 − τ)(α + βγ(1 − τ))
1 − (α + βγ(1 − τ))2 (36)
where, as usual, γ =( σ −1)/σ. If the product of these two derivatives is everywhere less than 1, there is a
unique equilibrium. If it exceeds 1 for some value of σ, on the other hand, there may be multiplicity. It is
easily veriﬁed that ∂D(τ,γ)/∂ lnσ<1 if and only if
(α + βγ(1 − τ))(α + β(1 − τ)) < 1. (37)
The ﬁrst term is always less than one (or else inequality explodes; moreover, this can never occur when τ is
40Kremer and Maskin (1996) present evidence for a related intervening mechanism (similar to ∂σ∗/∂∆ > 0 in this model),
although not for how educational returns and wage inequality are ultimately aﬀected. They show that in US states character-
ized by greater human capital inequality, there is more segregation of workers by skills (the ratio of within- to between-plant
skill dispersion is lower).
24endogenously chosen), but the second need not be, especially if τ<0. We can thus conclude that the kind
of “technology-inequality trap” described above becomes a real possibility under regressive or insuﬃciently
progressive policies. In particular, education systems that result in signiﬁcant resource disparities between
students, such as private ﬁnancing or local (property-tax based) school funding as in the United States, are
fertile ground for the joint emergence of highly skill-biased production processes and a persistently skewed
skill distribution. Furthermore, as we shall see below, endogenizing τ only increases the likelihood of such
outcomes, since the degree of redistribution tends to fall with inequality.
A third point is that even under the less extreme conditions where no such trap exists, ﬁrms’ decisions
involve a dynamic externality that tends to result in excessively skill-biased or ﬂexible technologies. Indeed,
each takes the distribution of skills it faces as given but neglects the eﬀects of its own ﬂexibility on workers’
human capital investments, and therefore on subsequent distributions. More speciﬁcally, while a marginal
change in σt has only second-order eﬀects on the current production costs faced by ﬁrms, it has three
ﬁrst-order eﬀects on growth.41 First, a lower σt would reduce current income inequality γt∆t, which is
growth-enhancing given the presence of credit constraints. This would in turn lower the skill disparities
∆t+k that ﬁrms will face in the future, as well as the costs c(σ∗(∆t+k)) they will bear to adapt to
this heterogeneity. Although γt =( σt − 1)/σt also aﬀects in a somewhat complex way the concavity of
educational investment (where it interacts with α, β and τt), it is easy to identify cases where growth in
every period would be higher if ﬁrms collectively chose less skill-biased technologies.
For instance, let α =0 ,β=1 , and 1/η =0(inelastic labor supply), and ﬁx any constant policy τ;
the interactions of technology choice and policy decisions will be examined in the next section. In the
resulting steady state, the degree of ﬂexibility and the dispersion in skills are given by the two equations
σ∞ = σ∗(∆∞) and ∆∞ = D(τ,γ∞), where γ∞ ≡ (σ∞ − 1)/σ∞.42 The corresponding asymptotic growth
rate is computed in the appendix, and equals:




A marginal reduction in σ from its equilibrium value, if it were permanently implemented by all ﬁrms,
would then increase steady-state growth, since:
∂g∞
∂σ























In this expression the ﬁrst two terms cancel out by the ﬁrst-order condition (34), while the last one reﬂects
41As explained in footnote 38, when 1/η > 0 ah i g h e rσt also raises the return to labor supply δt =( σt − 1)/σt, inducing
all agents to work more.
42I assume here that (37) holds, so that this steady-state is unique (given τ), although this is inessential to the argument.
25the dynamic externality. The above result holds more generally for any equilibrium path that is either near
the steady state, or such that σt converges to its long-run value from above (see the appendix).
Ineﬃcient choices of technology or ﬁrm organization arise in a number of models where market imper-
fections create an excessive role for the distribution of ﬁnancial or human wealth to shape the structure
of production, with the result of exacerbating inequality and making it more persistent. In Banerjee and
Newman (1993) and Newman and Legros (1998), for instance, the moral-hazard problem aﬀecting entrepre-
neurship combines with an unequal wealth distribution in forcing too many agents to work for low wages in
large ﬁrms, rather than setting up their own. In Vindigni (2002) an extreme example of the technology trap
studied above occurs, as ﬁrms’ decisions (choosing the arrival rate of exogenously skill-biased innovations)
can permanently conﬁne some dynasties of workers below the ﬁxed income threshold required to invest in
human capital.43 In Grossman (2004), a high variance of human capital in the labor force increases the
incentives of the most skilled agents to work in sectors where individual productivity is observable, rather
than in those where output is team-determined; because they fail to internalize the spillovers they would
have on team productivity, the resulting occupational segregation is ineﬃciently high.
IV Endogenous Institutions and Endogenous Technology
Combining the main mechanisms analyzed in previous sections yields a model where the distribution of
human capital, the technologies used by ﬁrms and the policy implemented by the state are all endogenous
—as they are in reality. The dynamical system governing the economy’s evolution remains recursive:

   





where Γ(∆) ≡ (σ∗(∆) − 1)/σ∗(∆) represents the technology outcome given by Proposition 8, T(γ∆) the
policy outcome given by Proposition 3, and D(∆,τ,γ) the transmission of human capital inequality given
in Proposition 2. The resulting aggregate growth rate, ln(yt+1/yt)=g(τt,∆t,γt), follows from Proposition
2. Finally, steady states are solutions to the ﬁxed-point equation
∆ = D(∆,T(∆;Γ(∆)),Γ(∆)). (41)
43A more benign form of multiplicity (with greater wage inequality now going together with more, rather than less, total
human capital) occurs in Acemoglu (1998). In his model, a relative abundance of skilled workers makes it more proﬁtable for
ﬁrms to develop skill-biased technologies; this then raises the wage premium, encouraging more workers to become skilled.
26This structure makes clear the presence of important multiplier e¤ects: a transitory shock a¤ecting
inequality (e.g., more idiosyncratic uncertainty v2) or the political system (a higher ‚) will be ampli…ed
throughtechnology decisions, the policy choice, and the intergenerational transmission mechanism, and may
thus have considerable long-term consequences.44 Mostimportantly, in accountingfor changesin inequality
one can no longer treat technological and institutional factors as separate, competing explanations: both
are jointly determined, and complementary. The model thus shows how, in the words of Freeman (1995),
one needs to think of “the Welfare State as a system”.
To demonstrate these points I shall assume from here on a piecewise-linear technological frontier.
Flexibility is free up to ￿L; then has a marginal cost of M > 0; up to a maximum level ￿H > ￿L :
c(￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 for ￿ < ￿L
M(￿¡ ￿L) for ￿ 2 [￿L; ￿H]
+1 for ￿ > ￿H
: (42)
I will denote ￿i = (￿i ¡1)=￿i; i 2 fL; Hg: The analogue of Proposition 8 in this case is very simple, as the







The unique symmetric outcome is thus ￿t = ￿L when ¢2
t=2M < ￿2






H), on the other hand, …rms mix between ￿L and ￿H; in proportions such that
the resulting factor prices make each one indi¤erent; this equilibrium will be denoted ￿LH:45 Focussing
now on technology-inequality steady states, for any ¿ · 1 and ￿ ¸ 1 the marginal bene…t of ‡exibility
(right-hand-side of (43)) equals
R(¿; ￿) ´
D(¿; (￿ ¡ 1)=￿)2
2￿2 ;
where D(¿;￿) is the asymptotic variance under the policy ¿ and return to skill ￿; given by (21). Thus,
under any time-invariant policy ¿; whether exogenous or endogenous:
² For M > maxfR(¿; ￿L); R(¿; ￿H)g; the unique technological steady state is ￿L;
² For M < minfR(¿; ￿L); R(¿; ￿H)g, it is ￿H;
² If R(¿; ￿L) > R(¿; ￿H), then for M 2 [R(¿; ￿H); R(¿;￿L)] it is the mixed-strategy outcome ￿LH;
² If R(¿; ￿L) < R(¿; ￿H), then for M 2 [R(¿; ￿L);R(¿; ￿H)] there are three technological steady states:
44The long-run multiplier for any shock to the D function (e.g., a change in w2) is „ ´ ‡












: Similarly, the long-run e¤ects on inequality of a shock to the T function
(e.g., a change in ‚) its is „ ¢ D2(@T=@‚):
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Figure 5:
The response of technology and policy to a decline in the cost of ‡exibility (case (i)).
Under each range of M appears the unique (￿; ¿) such that (￿; ¢ = D(¿; 1¡ 1=￿))
is a stable steady state given ¿ and M: The subset reached via solid lines corresponds
to the stable steady-states in (￿; ¢;¿) jointly, when policy is endogenous as well.
￿L; ￿H; and ￿LH; the …rst two are stable, the third one unstable.
Furthermore, since R(¿; ￿) is decreasing in ¿; we have:
Proposition 9 More skill-biased technologies appear …rst in, and less skill biased technologies disappear
…rst from, countries that have less redistributive …scal, educational or labor market institutions. For any
M > 0 :
1) If ￿H is a steady state equilibrium technology under a constant redistributive policy ¿; this remains true
under any less progressive policy ¿0 < ¿:
2) If ￿L is a steady state equilibrium technology under a constant redistributive policy ¿0; this remains true
under any more progressive policy ¿ < ¿0:
These results are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6 for two cases where: i) R(¿;￿H) < R(¹ ¿; ￿L); implying
that for each M there is a unique technology compatible in the long-run with each policy ¿ 2 f¿; ¹ ¿g;46
ii) R(¿; ￿L) < R(¹ ¿; ￿H); implying that for either policy ¿ 2 f¿; ¹ ¿g there is a range of M’s where multiple
technologies are sustainable. The message is essentially the same in both cases, showing how a world-wide
shift in the set of feasible technologies can result in di¤erent evolutions of both production processes and
the skill premium across countries. In particular, the model can help explain why skill-biased technical
change and reorganization occurred …rst, and to a greater extent, in the United States compared toEurope
–and within Europe, more so in England than on the Continent.47
46For instance, under condition (37), @ln¢1=@ ln￿ < 1; so R(¿;￿H) < R(¿;￿L) provided ￿H and ￿L are close enough. If
¿ and ¹ ¿ are also not too di¤erent, then R(¹ ¿;￿) - R(¿;￿) for ￿ = ￿H;￿L; so the thresholds rank as illustrated on Figure 5.
47Acemoglu (2003) proposes a di¤erent mechanism, based on imperfectly competitive labor markets, through which the
wage-compression policies of continental European countries may have caused technological progress there to be less skill-
biased than in the United States. In his model, a binding minimum wage makes low-skill workers’ compensation a …xed price,
whereas for high-skill workers the binding constraint for the …rm is rent-sharing (due to search market frictions), which acts
as a tax on productivity improvements. As a result, …rms in high minimum-wage countries have greater incentives to invest
in technologies that are complementary to low-skill labor than high-skill labor. In both Acemoglu’s and the present model,

























































The response of technology and policy to a decline in the cost of ‡exibility (case (ii)).
Under each range of M appear the values of (￿;¿) such that (￿; ¢ = D(¿;1¡ 1=￿))
is a stable steady state given ¿ and M: The subset reached via solid lines corresponds
to the stable steady-states in (￿; ¢; ¿) jointly, when policy is endogenous as well.
Indeed, consider two countries, C1 and C2, that are initially identical in all respects, including both
using the technology ￿L; except that one is in a laissez-faire equilibrium, ¿ = ¿; and the other in a welfare
state, ¿ = ¹ ¿: Suppose now that the technological frontier gradually ‡attens (M declines), meaning that
‡exibility becomes cheaper to achieve. As shown on Figures 5-6, the more skill-biased technology ￿H
becomes (all or part of) another feasible equilibrium in C1 before it does in C2; similarly, ￿L …rst ceases to
be viable (by itself or as part of a mixed equilibrium) in the laissez-faire country, while it is still sustainable
in the more redistributive one.
Going further, there are in fact reciprocal interactions between the economy’s technology response and
policy response to shocks. Proposition 9 and Figures 5-6 show that feasible new technologies are not
implemented unless institutions are su¢ciently inegalitarian. But, conversely, the occurrence of technical
change alters these same institutions, as seen in Proposition 7. Indeed, suppose that:
‚(￿L;B) < ‚ < ¹ ‚(￿L; B); (44)
where ¹ ‚ and ‚ were de…ned in (22)-(23). These inequalities imply that: i) under the technology ￿L; both
social contracts ¿ and ¹ ¿ are political steady states; ii) under ￿H; ¹ ¿ is a political steady state, while ¿ is one
if and only if we also have ‚ < ¹ ‚(￿H;B):
When this last inequality holds, the set of stable politico-economico-technological steady states (with
endogenous ¿; ¢ and ￿) is the same as described on Figures 5-6. When ‚ > ¹ ‚(￿H; B); however, the more
redistributive social contract ¹ ¿ is not politically sustainable under the amount of inequality that results,
in the long run, from the technology ￿H: Therefore one must remove from the set of steady states on
each …gure the “branches” corresponding to this outcome; these are indicated by the dashed lines. The
Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), by contrast, agents with di¤erent vintages of human capital vote directly on whether or not to
































Figure 7: International spillovers between social contracts
remaining solid lines then indicate that only certain politico-technological con…gurations can be observed
in the long run: a) for low values of M; e.g. for M < R(¹ ¿; ￿L) on the …rst …gure, the only feasible social
contract is ¿; together with the technology ￿H; b) on the second …gure, for M 2 (R(¹ ¿; ￿L); R(¿;￿L))
only the egalitarian social contract and the egalitarian technology, or the inegalitarian social contract and
inegalitarian technology, are mutually compatible.
V Exporting Inequality: Spillovers Between Social Contracts
The model also allows us to think about spillovers between national policies or institutions, operating via
technological and organizational di¤usion. The basic idea is illustrated in Figure 7, which shows how the
social contract in Country 2 can, over time, be a¤ected by technological or even purely political shifts in
Country 1, propagated along the channels indicated by the solid lines on the diagram.
As seen in the previous section, …rms operating in countries with more laissez-faire …scal, educational
or labor market policies have greater incentives to develop and adopt low-complementarity production
processes. Suppose now that the cost of imitating, adapting or copying a more ‡exible technology or
organizational form, once it has been developed and implemented elsewhere, is lower than the cost of
innovation; in terms of the model, it is m < M: This lower marginal cost may for instance re‡ect, as in
Acemoglu (1998), an imperfect international enforcement of property rights over technological or organi-
zational innovations. As we shall see, redistributive institutions in one country will then be signi…cantly
a¤ected, perhaps even completely undermined, by technological or political changes occurring in another.48
48As mentioned earlier I abstract here from international trade, which could be yet another channel of transmission. See
Grossman and Maggi (2000), Grossman (2004) or Thoenig and Verdier (2003) for papers that study the e¤ects of trade
openness on technical and organizational change, although not their political economy implications.
30A A Shift in One Country’s Technological Frontier
I shall focus here on parameter con…gurations that satisfy the following conditions:
max
©
‚(￿L;B); ¹ ‚(￿H; B)
ª
< ‚ < ¹ ‚(￿L; B); (45)
maxfR(¿; ￿L); R(¿; ￿H)g < M; (46)
m < R(¹ ¿; ￿L) < M0 < minfR(¿; ￿L); R(¿; ￿H)g; (47)
which imply in particular that M > M0 > m: As shown as part of Proposition 10 below, these conditions
also ensure that the technology ￿L allows for both social contracts ¿ and ¹ ¿; and conversely that ￿L is an
equilibrium technology under both social contracts (no …rm wants to switch to ￿H):
Proposition 10 Assume that conditions (45)–(47) are satis…ed, and consider two countries, C1 and C2;
that both start in steady state, with the same technology ￿L: Suppose now that the cost of ‡exibility in
country C1 declines from M to M0:
1) If both C1 and C2 were initially in the more egalitarian of the two regimes compatible with ￿L nothing
happens, in the sense that (¹ ¿;￿L; D(¹ ¿; ￿L)) remains a stable steady state for both countries.
2) If C1 was initially in the more inegalitarian regime (¿; ￿L;D(¿;￿L)); the unique long run outcome is
for both countries to switch to the technology ￿H; and for country C2 to also adopt the more unequal social
contract ¿ : the unique steady state for the two countries is now (¿; ￿H; D(¿; ￿H)):
The intuition is as follows. Even as M declines to M0; …rms faced with the skill distribution D(¹ ¿; ￿L)
resulting from ¹ ¿ do not …nd it pro…table to switch technology. Given the higher dispersion D(¿; ￿L) that
prevails under ¿; however, if country C1 starts in this regime all …rms there will eventually switch to
technology ￿H:49 Next, given the lower cost of ‡exibility m to which …rms in C2 now have access through
imitation, ￿L is no longer viable there even under ¹ ¿: And, in turn, with the higher income inequality that
results in the long run from technology ￿H; the only politically sustainable social contract is ¿:
These results make clear how technological change (a shift in the frontier) has signi…cant e¤ects only
when it is mediated through speci…c institutions –namely, which social contract C1 had adopted; and,
conversely, how under such conditions it will then a¤ect institutions in other countries, namely here in C2:
B A Shift in One Country’s Political Institutions
I consider now a second scenario, namely the transmission of a political shock. Having seen earlier how
the mere fact of being in di¤erent institutional steady states (say, for historical reasons) can lead to
49I leave aside the dynamics here, but they are straightforward: since (45) implies that (25) holds for ￿ = ￿L; ￿H; we
always operate on the portion of the T(￿¢) curve where increases in inequality imply decreases in the tax rate.
31very di¤erent technological trajectories, I shall assume here that C1 and C2 both start in the egalitarian
steady state, (¹ ¿; ￿L;D(¹ ¿;￿L)); with the same technology ￿L: Let C1 now experience an increase in the
political in‡uence of wealth, from ‚ to ‚
0: This may re‡ect a rising importance of lobbying and campaign
contributions, an exogenous decline in unionization, or a lower electoral turnout by the poor. It may even
simply represent the political outcome during a particular period in which the electorate stochastically
shifted to the right.50 I shall assume here the following conditions:
¹ ‚(￿H; B) < ‚ < ¹ ‚(￿L; B) < ‚0; (48)
m < R(¹ ¿; ￿L) < M < minfR(¿;￿L);R(¿; ￿H)g: (49)
Proposition 11 Assume that conditions (48)–(49) are satis…ed. Consider two countries, C1 and C2; that
both start in the egalitarian steady state, (¹ ¿;￿L; D(¹ ¿; ￿L)); with the same technology ￿L: Suppose now that
the political in‡uence of wealth in country C1 rises from ‚ to ‚
0: The unique long run outcome is for both
countries to switch to the technology ￿H and the more unequal social contract ¿; thus ending up at the
steady state (¿; ￿H; D(¿; ￿H)):
As a result of the initial political shift, redistribution ¿1 (…scal, educational, or via labor-market insti-
tutions) in country C1 declines. This leads over time to a rise in human capital inequality ¢1; to which
…rms respond by adopting more ‡exible, wage-disequalizing technologies, switching from ￿L to ￿H and
further precipitating the shift from ¹ ¿ to ¿: Their counterparts in C2; which would not have developed such
technologies by themselves, now …nd it pro…table to copy them from C1: This results in a rise in income
inequality ￿2¢2 in C2 (and, over time, in human-capital inequality ¢2 itself) that ultimately leads to the
unravelling of the Welfare State in that country as well.
VI Concluding Comments
This paper o¤ers a new, uni…ed model toanalyze the reciprocal interactions between the distribution of hu-
man wealth, technology, and redistributive institutions. It identi…es in particular certain core mechanisms
that allow alternative societal models to persist, as well as powerful forces pushing towards uniformization.
Key among the former is the interplay of imperfections in asset markets and in the political system that
can lead to multiple steady states where inequality and redistribution are negatively correlated. Amongthe
latter is skill-biased technical change, which can potentially lead to the unravelling of the Welfare State.
When technological or organizational form is endogenous, moreover, …rms respond to greater human cap-
ital heterogeneity with more ‡exible technologies, further exacerbating income inequality. The possibility
50Indeed, the political shock need not be permanent, provided the speed at which ‚ reverts to its previous value is low
enough, relative to those of human capital adjustment and technological or organizational evolution.
32for …rms in di¤erent countries to thus choose technologies adapted to the local labor force can also make
it easier to sustain multiple social models. The international di¤usion of technology, however, implies
that the more ‡exible, skill-biased technologies pro…tably developed in nations with greater inequality
and less redistributive institutions may then be imitated by …rms in other countries, thereby triggering
a “chain reaction” that moves the whole system towards a common outcome that is more inegalitarian
–technologically, economically, and politically speaking. Such international spillovers between national
social contracts are important concerns in the debate over globalization, and warrant further research.
33Appendix
Proofs of Propositions 1-5. See Bénabou (2000); I shall only provide here:
(i) the formula for the break-even income level ~ yt where ^ yi
t = yi
t;
ln ~ yt = ￿mt + – lnlt + (2¡ ¿t)￿2¢2
t=2 + (1¡ ¿t)v2=2; (A.1)
(ii) the laws of motion for (mt; ¢2
t) that underlie Proposition 2,
mt+1 = (ﬁ + ﬂ￿)mt + ﬂ– lnlt + ﬂ ¿t (2¡ ¿t)(￿2¢2
t + v2)=2+ ln
¡
•sﬂ¢
¡ (w2 + ﬂv2)=2 (A.2)
¢2
t+1 = (ﬁ + ﬂ￿(1¡ ¿t))2 ¢2
t + ﬂ
2(1¡ ¿t)2v2 + w2; (A.3)
(iii) and the formula for each agent’s intertemporal welfare that underlies Proposition 3: under a rate of
redistribution ¿t;
U i
t = ¹ ut + A(¿t)(lnki




where ¹ ut is independent of the policy ¿t; B ´ a + ‰(1¡ a)(1¡ ﬂ) was de…ned in (14) and:
A(¿) ´ ‰ﬁ + (1¡ ‰+ ‰ﬂ)￿(1¡ ¿); (A.5)
C(¿) ´ (1¡ ‰)(– lnl(¿)¡ l(¿)·)+ ‰ﬂ– lnl(¿); (A.6)
The …rst-order condition (15) readily follows. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7. Because D(¿;￿) is increasing in ￿ for all ¿ the functions ¹ ‚(￿; B) and ‚(￿;B)
are both U-shaped in ￿; and minimized at the point where ￿D(¿;￿) = v
p
B; for ¿ = ¹ ¿; ¿ respectively.
Furthermore, the minimum of ¹ ‚(￿; B) occurs to the right of that of ‚(￿;B): Under the assumption that
v
p
B > ￿max D(¿; ￿max) we have ￿D(¹ ¿; ￿) < ￿D(¿;￿) < v
p
B for all ￿ · ￿max; implying that both ¹ ‚(￿;B)
and ‚(￿; B) are decreasing in ￿ over [0; ￿max]; they are obviously increasing in B: Inverting these functions
with respect to ￿ yields the claimed properties of ￿(‚; B) and ¹ ￿(‚; B): ¥
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider a …rm ^ { 2 [0; 1] with technology ^ ￿ and associated productivity factor
^ A ´ A(^ ￿): Its marginal cost is:





























The …rst-order condition for cost-minimization is:
34p
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which establishes (32). Now, replacing the equilibrium prices from equation (27) yields:







































t’s are independent. We now eliminate the terms common to all …rms by computing














































































The (necessary and su¢cient) …rst-order condition for …rm ^ { is therefore: c0(^ ￿) = ¢2
t=2￿2
t: Evaluating it
at ^ ￿ = ￿t yields the technology-equilibrium condition ￿2
tc0(￿t) = ¢2
t=2; which by convexity of c(¢) has a
unique solution ￿¤(¢t); increasing in ¢t: Finally, the result that @ ln￿¤=@ln¢ 2 (0; 1) is established in
equation (35). ¥
Proof of Section III.C’s claims concerning growth with endogenous technology. In the general
growth formula (12), – lnlt is now replaced everywhere (according to (28)) by









= –t lnlt + ￿tlnA(￿t)+ (1¡ ￿t)lnyt:
This leads to:
35￿t ln(yt+1=yt) = ￿t [ln•+ ﬂ lns + –t+1lnlt+1 ¡ ﬁ–t lnlt + lnA(￿t+1)¡ ﬁlnA(￿t)]
¡￿t(1¡ ￿t)w2=2¡ ﬂ￿t(1¡ ﬂ￿t)(1¡ ¿t)2v2=2
¡
£
ﬁ + ﬂ￿t(1¡ ¿t)







For ﬁ = 0 and ﬂ = 1; this simpli…es to:













= ￿t [ln•+ lns + lnlt+1 + lnA(￿t+1)]
¡￿t(1¡ ￿t)
£





or, …nally, since ¢2
t+1 = ￿2(1¡ ¿t)2¢2
t + (1¡ ¿t)2v2 + w2 :
ln(yt+1=yt) = ln•+ lns + –t+1 lnlt+1 + lnA(￿t+1)¡ (1¡ ￿t)¢2
t+1=2






t+1 from (11), the growth rate between t and t + 1 is thus:




Therefore, with …xed labor supply (1=· = 0); if all …rms are forced to use technology ￿t ¡ d￿ instead of ￿t
in every period the impact on growth will be d￿ times
@gt
@￿
































where we have used the condition for equilibrium technology choice in Proposition (8). The growth impact
is thus positive in all periods provided that either ￿2
t+1 ¼ ￿2
t (we start in or near the steady state), or
￿2
t+1 · ￿2
t (we start with “excessive” heterogeneity with respect to the steady state). ¥
Proof of Proposition 10. We begin with some preliminaries. Given a technology ￿ and associated ￿ =
(￿ ¡ 1)=￿; recall from (22)-(23) that the tax rate ¹ ¿ is a steady-state political equilibrium, which we shall
denote as ¹ ¿ 2 P(￿; ‚); if and only if ‚ · ¹ ‚(￿;B): Similarly, ¿ 2 P(￿;‚) if and only if ‚ ¸ ‚(￿; B):
36Conversely, given a tax rate ¿ we see from (43) that the technology ￿L and associated ￿L = (￿L¡1)=￿L
is a technological steady state when the slope of the technology frontier is M; which we denote as ￿L 2






Conversely, the technology ￿H and associated ￿H = (￿H ¡1)=￿H is a technological steady state, which we






A policy-technology combination (¿; ￿) 2 f¹ ¿; ¿g £ f￿L; ￿Hg is then a full steady-state if and only if
¿ 2 P(￿;‚) and ￿ 2 T(¿;M): Clearly, there are at most four stable steady-states (we restrict attention
here to cases where the technology equilibrium is in pure strategies). We now proceed through a sequence
of three claims, which together establish the proposition.
Claim 1: for a country facing the technological frontier M; the only steady states are (¹ ¿; ￿L) and
(¿; ￿L): Indeed, the …rst inequality in (45) states that ￿L 2 T(¿; M) and this is easily seen to imply that
￿L 2 T(¹ ¿; M): Conversely, the second inequality states that ￿H = 2 T(¿; M) and this is easily seen to imply
that ￿L 2 T(¹ ¿; M): Finally, the fact that ‚(￿L;B) < ‚ < ¹ ‚(￿L; B) due to (45) means that ¿ 2 P(￿L; ‚)
and ¹ ¿ 2 P(￿0
L; ‚):
Claim 2: for a country facing the technological frontier M0; the only steady states are (¹ ¿; ￿L) and
(¿; ￿H): Indeed, note …rst from (47) that R(¹ ¿; ￿L) < M0 means that we still have ￿L 2 T(¹ ¿; M0); by
contrast, M0 < minfR(¿; ￿L); R(¿; ￿H)g means that ￿H 2 T(¿; M) but ￿L = 2 T(¹ ¿;M): The only possible
equilibria are thus (¹ ¿;￿L); (¿; ￿H) and (¿; ￿H): Turning now to (45), the fact that ‚ < ¹ ‚(￿L; B) means
that ¹ ¿ 2 P(￿0
L; ‚); the fact that that ¹ ‚(￿H; B) < ‚; on the other hand, means that ¿ 2 P(￿H;‚) but
¿ = 2 P(￿H; ‚): So only the …rst two of the three preceding con…gurations are full equilibria.
Claim 3: for a country facing the technological frontier m; the only steady state is (¿; ￿H): Observe from
(47) that m satis…es all the same inequalities as M0; except that m < R(¹ ¿; ￿L) whereas R(¹ ¿; ￿L) < M0:
This means that whereaswe had ￿L 2 T(¹ ¿; M0); we now have ￿L = 2 T(¹ ¿; M0): This rules out the equilibrium
(¹ ¿; ￿L); leaving only (¿; ￿H): ¥
Proof of Proposition 11.
Claim 1: in the initial parameter con…guration, (¹ ¿ ; ￿L) is a steady state (and even the only steady-
state with policy ¹ ¿). Indeed, the fact that ¹ ‚(￿H; B) < ‚ < ¹ ‚(￿L;B) means that ¹ ¿ 2 P(￿L; ‚); whereas
¹ ¿ = 2 P(￿H; ‚): The rest of the claim follows from the fact ￿L 2 T (¹ ¿;M); since M > R(¹ ¿; ￿L):
37Claim 2: After the political shift in C1; (¿; ￿H) is the only steady-state for that country. First, since
‚0 > ¹ ‚(￿L; B) > ¹ ‚(￿H; B) we now have ¹ ¿ = 2 P(￿L; ‚0) and ¹ ¿ = 2 P(￿H; ‚0); so there is no steady-state with
policy ¹ ¿: Moreover, since M < R(¿;￿L) we have ￿L = 2 T (¿; M); so the only possible equilibrium is (¿; ￿H):
It is indeed an equilibrium, as M < R(¿;￿H) means that ￿H 2 T (¿; M); while ¹ ‚(￿H; B) < ‚
0 means that
¿ 2 P(￿H; ‚
0):
Claim 3: After C1 has switched to the technology ￿H; sothat C2 faces the technology frontier m; the only
steady-state for C2 is (¿; ￿H): First the fact m < R(¹ ¿; ￿L) < R(¿; ￿L) implies that (¹ ¿; ￿L) is no longer a
technological equilibrium, and a fortiori neither is (¿;￿L): Second, the fact m < minfR(¿;￿L);R(¿; ￿H)g
means that the only technological equilibrium under policy ¿ is ￿H: Finally, since ‚ > ¹ ‚(￿H; B); ¿ 2
P(￿H; ‚) whereas ¹ ¿ = 2 P(￿H; ‚); which concludes the proof. ¥
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